Fertility differences by education in Britain and France: The role of religion by Peri-Rotem, N
 
  
Fertility differences by education in Britain and France: The role of
religion
Nitzan Peri Rotem
In Population Volume 75, Issue 1, January 2020, pages 9 to 36
 
ISSN 0032-4663
This document is the English version of:
Nitzan Peri Rotem, «Écarts de fécondité en fonction du niveau d’instruction : le rôle de la religion en Grande-Bretagne et en France»,





How to cite this article:
Nitzan Peri Rotem, «Écarts de fécondité en fonction du niveau d’instruction : le rôle de la religion en Grande-Bretagne et en France»,
Population 2020/1 (Vol. 75) , p. 9-36
 
Electronic distribution by Cairn on behalf of I.N.E.D.
© I.N.E.D. All rights reserved for all countries.  
 
Reproducing this article (including by photocopying) is only authorized in accordance with the general terms and conditions of use for
the website, or with the general terms and conditions of the license held by your institution, where applicable. Any other reproduction,
in full or in part, or storage in a database, in any form and by any means whatsoever is strictly prohibited without the prior written
consent of the publisher, except where permitted under French law.   







































































Fertility Differences by Education  
in Britain and France: The Role of Religion
Among the many determinants of fertility studied in developed 
countries, educational attainment and religious affiliation are important 
and opposing factors. While fertility levels rise with religious affiliation, 
they fall with women’s education levels. The combined effect of these 
two characteristics is uncertain. Does religious affiliation attenuate the 
effect of educational attainment? Does education mitigate the effect of 
religion? Do these relationships vary across cultural contexts? To answer 
these questions, this article examines the entry into parenthood and 
completed fertility of cohorts of women born between the 1920s and 
1960s in the United Kingdom and France according to their religious 
affiliation and practice and their level of education.
Education has long been recognized as a key factor in explaining fertility 
behaviour among women, as higher education is associated with lower fertility 
levels via several mechanisms. For example, extended time in education leads to 
the postponement of women’s age at first birth (Ní Bhrolcháin and Beaujouan, 
2012), which may result in higher rates of childlessness or lower completed fertility. 
Furthermore, education can introduce changes in traditional family values and 
preferences (McDonald, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 2009). Becker’s (1991) economic 
theory of the family predicts that a rise in women’s earning potential reduces the 
demand for children by increasing the opportunity costs of leaving the labour 
market to care for a child. Moreover, the quality–quantity trade-off model proposed 
by Becker and Lewis (1973) anticipates that parents with higher income invest 
more in their children’s quality of life, which raises the cost of each additional 
child and leads to lower fertility. However, some authors suggest that the relation-
ship between education and fertility may vary according to cultural contexts, such 
as religious affiliation and the extent of religious involvement, which affect the 
perceived costs and benefits attributed to childbearing and rearing (Heaton, 1998; 
Lehrer, 2004; Goldscheider, 2006; Newman and Hugo, 2006). 
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Recent studies have documented the continuing relevance of religion to 
childbearing behaviour in Western countries. Across Europe and the 
United States, religiously affiliated individuals have more children compared 
to those who report having no religion (Philipov and Berghammer, 2007; Frejka 
and Westoff, 2008). Moreover, those who are more devout in each denomination 
(measured by religious service attendance and self-assessed religiosity) register 
higher fertility than their less religious peers (Philipov and Berghammer, 2007; 
Frejka and Westoff, 2008; Zhang, 2008; Berghammer, 2012; Peri-Rotem, 2016). 
These patterns are attributed to the most prominent religious traditions  attaching 
greater importance to family life and childbearing (Norris and Inglehart, 2004; 
Chatters and Taylor, 2005; Adsera, 2006). Nevertheless, the relevance of religion 
to fertility behaviour is not limited to specific religious doctrines on methods 
of family planning or family-size norms. According to Goldscheider (1971, 
2006), the mechanism by which religion shapes fertility behaviour is better 
understood within the wider context of social organization, such as the social 
norms and gender-role perceptions associated with different religious com-
munities. Furthermore, women’s investment in education and their level of 
participation in the labour force are also linked with religious affiliation and 
practice (Lehrer, 2004), which may affect fertility outcomes. 
The interaction between education and religion and its implications for 
fertility outcomes are of particular interest due to education’s association with 
the rejection of religious authority and traditions (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn, 
1988; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2004). Nonetheless, little is known about the 
interrelationships of education, religion, and fertility outcomes in Europe, 
where the religious landscape has been changing rapidly over recent decades. 
Focusing on completed fertility and childlessness, this study adds to the 
 literature by analysing fertility differences by education and the way this 
 relationship varies by religious affiliation and religiosity among women born 
between the late 1920s and late 1960s in Britain and France (for simplicity, 
this paper refers to those born in these countries as British and French, even 
though some may not be citizens). These countries provide useful case studies 
for this research because they share some sociodemographic characteristics 
and are geographically close. However, they differ in their religious composition 
and cultural heritage: the dominant religion in France is Roman Catholicism, 
whereas Britain is largely Protestant, with the Church of England as the estab-
lished religious institution. Thus, most British Christians identify as Protestant, 
and only a minority (about 10% of the population) identify as Roman Catholic 
(Lee, 2012). Among non-Christian populations in Britain and France, Muslims 
comprise the largest faith community. Although the overall share of non- 
Christian populations is increasing, it represents less than a tenth of the 
populations in Britain and France (Pew Research Center, 2015).(1) 
(1) Based on population estimates from 2010. These groups are not included in this study due to their 
small sample sizes in the analysed birth cohorts (see Appendix Table A.1 for a detailed description 








































































During the latter half of the 20th century, both Britain and France expe-
rienced a marked decline in the proportion of religiously affiliated persons 
and religious service attendance (Lee, 2012; Baudin, 2015). In both Britain and 
France, the decline in religiosity is largely generational: over one-fifth of those 
born in the 1930s attended religious services on a monthly basis, whereas this 
proportion drops to around 10% among those born in the 1960s (Peri-Rotem, 
2016). Nonetheless, previous studies highlight the continuing importance of 
religion in shaping attitudes and behaviour among actively religious individuals 
(Régnier-Loilier and Prioux, 2008; Peri-Rotem, 2016). 
British Roman Catholics attend church more often than their Protestant 
counterparts, with 45% of Roman Catholics going at least once a month com-
pared to 18% of Anglicans (Lee, 2012). Less than a fifth of French Roman 
Catholics attend church on a monthly basis, which is lower than other European 
Catholic countries (Pew Research Center, 2013). The low rate of church atten-
dance in France is likely due to the historical conflict between the Catholic 
Church and the secular state, which dates to the French Revolution and ulti-
mately led to the 1905 constitutional separation of church and state (Hubert, 
2015). In Britain, on the other hand, religious practice among the Catholic 
community is partly shaped by immigration flows from Ireland, Italy, and 
Poland, countries where religious participation remains relatively high (Greeley, 
2003; Weller, 2007). 
Although only a minority of people in Britain and in France regularly 
attend religious services, more than half of these populations identified as 
Christians in 2010 (Pew Research Center, 2015). Thus, both countries are 
comprised of people who state they have no religious affiliation; are affiliated 
with a particular denomination but do not regularly attend religious services 
(‘nominally religious’); and are practising religious individuals.
The fertility patterns of both countries trend towards a decline across 
cohorts born from the 1930s to the 1960s. Average completed cohort fertility 
dropped from 2.3 to 1.9 children in Britain and from 2.5 to 2.0 children in 
France (Human Fertility Database, 2017). However, Britain and France differ 
in their distributions of fertility across different age groups. Rendall et al. 
(2005, 2009) found that the age distribution at first birth among women born 
in the 1950s and 1960s is much more homogeneous in France than in Britain, 
as the latter is more polarized by social strata. This pattern results from 
highly educated women postponing birth in Britain compared to their less 
educated peers. These differences are attributed to each country’s distinct 
family-policy regimes. France is characterized by a universalistic family 
policy with a relatively generous child-care provision, whereas family benefits 
in Britain are means-tested. Consequently, British women with higher earn-
ings prospects are more incentivized to delay motherhood until later ages, 
as the opportunity costs of children are higher (Rendall et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, each country differs in their childbearing norms. For example, 







































































Merz and Liefbroer (2012, p. 594) used comparative data from the 2006 
European Social Survey to show that around 30% of French respondents 
expressed disapproval of voluntary childlessness compared to less than 10% 
of British respondents. 
I. Religion, education, and fertility outcomes
The relationship between religion and education is a subject of consider-
able debate. The standard theory of secularization proposes that extended 
mass education and advances in science promote a rational worldview and 
therefore undermine beliefs in God and the metaphysical (Berger, 1967; Bruce, 
2002). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on the relationship between 
religiosity and education is diverse. For example, Greeley (2003) found that 
unaffiliated individuals in Europe are more likely to be highly educated than 
religiously affiliated people. However, this negative correlation is restricted 
to those born between the 1920s and 1950s, whereas the relationship is 
reversed among more recent birth cohorts. Similarly, Hubert’s (2015) study 
on 1930s to 1960s French and other European cohorts concludes that reli-
giously affiliated people have benefitted more than the unaffiliated from 
educational expansion. Moreover, she found that, among the religiously 
affiliated, those who frequently attend religious services tend to be better 
educated than rare attendees. Thus, religious adherence is not necessarily 
incompatible with the pursuit of higher education; rather, it is the religious 
and cultural context that influences this relationship.
The interaction between religion and education may influence fertility 
outcomes. Previous studies have pointed to variations in education’s effect on 
fertility by level of religiosity, such as Newman’s and Hugo’s (2006) study of 
Australia, which found that fertility is more likely to drop with education 
among unaffiliated women when compared to their religiously affiliated peers. 
These relationships could be explained by the high value that religious tradi-
tions ascribe to family and children while also emphasising that traditional 
family roles be fulfilled (McQuillan, 2004; Norris and Inglehart, 2004; Chatters 
and Taylor, 2005). Thus, while increased levels of education are linked with 
greater emphasis on personal endeavours that may compete with familial roles, 
this effect may be weaker among women who are more religious.  
Alternatively, more religiously active women may perceive the oppor-
tunity costs of children as lower when compared to less religious women. 
For example, the costs and benefits of a large family may be influenced by 
the religious context, as some religious communities provide psychological 
and social rewards in the form of approval and higher status to those who 
conform to prescribed family norms (Lehrer, 2004). Newman and Hugo 
(2006) argued that Australian women raised in Christian religious families 








































































an education and a career. Thus, they perceive less conflict in combining 
family and work than do women with no religion. Other studies show that, 
compared to non-religious women, religiously observant women are more 
likely to adopt strategies for reconciling their family and work responsibil-
ities, such as taking jobs with flexible and reduced hours (Edgell, 2006; 
Glass and Nath, 2006). Similarly, a study on religious differences in the 
labour supply of British and French women born in 1955–1975 found that 
practising religious women were more likely than unaffiliated women to 
reduce their working hours during the most common childbearing ages 
(25–35). However, they found no differences in overall employment rates 
by religiosity (Peri-Rotem, 2015).  
Other scholars highlight that religious belief and practice contribute to 
the development of coping strategies for dealing with new and stressful situ-
ations as well as the difficulties of daily life, such as those associated with work 
and family responsibilities (Pargament et al., 2000; Chatters and Taylor, 2005). 
In particular, members of religious social networks mutually exchange emo-
tional and practical support (Putnam, 2000; Krause et al., 2001; Waite and 
Lehrer, 2003). For women with strong religious affiliations, this support may 
further reduce the direct and indirect costs of starting a family or having 
another child.  
From this perspective, although higher education is generally associated 
with higher rates of childlessness, highly religious women are demonstrably 
more inclined to start a family even after having obtained higher qualifications. 
Therefore, our first hypothesis postulates that the negative educational gradient 
in entry into motherhood is more pronounced for unaffiliated women than for 
nominally or practising religious women. 
Because affiliation with a religious community and attendance at religious 
services increase social capital, women who are more religious and seeking to 
expand their family may receive better support, be it emotional, material, or 
both. Among religious communities, the greater value and social incentives 
involved in having a large family may also influence the perceived costs of 
childbearing. More highly religious women would therefore be less likely to 
reduce their family size even if they have achieved higher education. Thus, 
our second hypothesis is that the completed fertility gradient by education is 
more strongly negative among unaffiliated women compared to their nominally 
and practising religious counterparts.
Figure 1 illustrates the expected interrelationships between education, 
religiosity, and fertility. Education leads to lower fertility, whereas religiosity 
increases fertility levels. However, we assume that education’s effect on fertility 
depends on religiosity, i.e. the negative relationship between education and 
fertility is expected to be weaker for women who are more religious. In addi-
tion, the relationship between religiosity and education is assumed to be 
negative in general.







































































II. Data and methods
1. Data sources
This study’s data are based on the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) 
(University of Essex, 2010) and the French Generations and Gender Survey 
(INED–INSEE, 2005). The French GGS is a panel survey, with the first wave 
carried out in 2005 and the second in 2008. However, due to a 35% non-random 
attrition rate between the first and second waves in the original sample (Régnier-
Loilier et al., 2011), only the first-wave data are included in this study. The 
French survey’s first wave covers a sample of around 10,000 individuals aged 
18–80. It includes not only detailed information on partnership, birth histories, 
and socioeconomic variables, but also data on religious affiliation and the 
frequency of religious service attendance.  
The BHPS is an annual survey of each member (aged 16 and older) of over 
5,000 households in a nationally representative sample (totalling more than 
10,000 individual interviews), covering 1991 through 2008 (18 waves).(2) The 
BHPS data were supplemented by consolidated files of union and birth histories 
for each respondent (Pronzato, 2011). The BHPS indicators of religiosity are 
similar to those of the GGS, although the question on religious affiliation was 
not asked every year. The analyses of British data are therefore based on the most 
recent survey from 2008, which contains more comprehensive information on 
religion. As this study’s purpose is to explore religious differences in childless-
ness and completed fertility, the subsample in each country includes women 
aged 40–80 (born between 1928 and 1968 in Britain and between 1925 and 1965 
in France) who have completed or nearly completed their childbearing period. 
To maintain the data’s representativeness, this study calculates all esti-
mates using country-specific population weights. The French GGS weight 
variable adjusts for non-response at the individual level. For the BHPS data, 
(2) Data from Northern Ireland are excluded because the religious characteristics of its population 
differ significantly from those in the other countries in the United Kingdom.















































































we use a cross-sectional weight for Wave 18 that includes new entrants, as 
this adjusts for unequal selection probabilities and the within-household 
non-response of individuals. 
2. Measures
Religion
We use a country-specific measure of religious affiliation for Britain and 
France. Respondents in each country were asked to choose a particular religion 
to which they adhere from a list of the dominant religions in each country, 
namely specific Christian denominations and a ‘no religion’ category. Among 
the religiously affiliated (Roman Catholics in France and either Protestants or 
Roman Catholics in Britain), we distinguish between women who attend reli-
gious services at least monthly (i.e. practising) and those who attend less than 
once a month or not at all (i.e. nominally religious). Monthly attendance is a 
commonly used cut-off for practising and non-practising individuals (Voas, 
2009; Burkimsher, 2014). Practising religious people represent a stronger 
adherence to religious tradition and values (Norris and Inglehart, 2004). Some 
religious groups are excluded from the study due to the insufficient sample 
size (see Appendix Table A.1). They represent about 10% of women aged 40–80 
in Britain and about 6% of the same in France. 
Education
For cross-country comparison, the measurement is based on UNESCO’s (1997) 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED-97). ISCED’s seven 
education categories (from 0 to 6) are grouped into three levels: ‘lower secondary’ 
(ISCED 0–2), which refers to having completed less than secondary school (low); 
‘upper secondary’ (ISCED 3–4) (medium), which refers to having completed sec-
ondary school or any non-tertiary post-secondary education; and ‘tertiary education’, 
which refers to having earned a Bachelor’s degree or higher (ISCED 5–6) (high).
Marital status
Marriage patterns are closely associated with religious affiliation and 
practice (Lehrer, 2004) as well as with fertility outcomes (Balbo et al., 2013). 
Therefore, the analyses of entry into motherhood and of completed fertility 
include a control for whether the respondent has ever been married.(3) 
Country of birth
Since immigration status is highly correlated with religion as well as with 
other sociodemographic characteristics (Kaufmann et al., 2012), our models 
(3) The never-married category includes women who have lived in non-marital cohabitation as 
well as unpartnered women. Because some religious groups have only few cases in either of these 
categories, they were merged.







































































include a binary variable indicating whether the respondent was born in the 
country of interview or abroad.
3. Analytical strategy
In the first stage, the sample characteristics of women aged 40–80 in each 
country are analysed to identify country-specific differences in the distribution 
of the key variables used in this study: religious group, education, marital 
status, nativity, average number of children ever born, and the proportion of 
women with children in each category. This provides the educational distri-
bution by religious group, which allows us to examine the relationship between 
religion and education in Britain and France.  
Childbearing probabilities for women aged 40–80 are estimated using a 
logistic regression model, where the dependent variable is given the value 1 if 
a woman has ever had children and 0 otherwise. This model controls for reli-
gion, education, birth cohort, whether the woman has ever married, and 
whether she is foreign-born. In addition, this model tests the interaction 
between education and religion. For comparisons, our interactive model cal-
culates the average predicted probabilities of entering motherhood for each 
religious group at different levels of education. We estimated the average 
number of children ever born to women in this sample (including childless 
women) using a Poisson regression model, which is specifically designed for 
count outcome variables (Long and Freese, 2006). This model’s covariates are 
similar to those of the logistic model and include the interaction between 
education and religion. The model therefore forms the basis for predicting the 
means of the number of children born, thus allowing us to compare the edu-
cational gradients in completed fertility across religious groups. 
4. Data limitations
This study has several limitations due to missing information and the sur-
veys’ structures. For instance, religious affiliation and frequency of religious 
service attendance are measured at the time of interview, after childbearing has 
already taken place, thus posing a risk of reverse causality between childbirth 
and religiosity. Previous studies from the United States have found that having 
children could lead to increased religious participation, at least in the years 
following childbirth (Stolzenberg et al., 1995; Argue et al., 1999; Ingersoll-Dayton 
et al., 2002). However, longitudinal studies conducted in Europe found little or 
no evidence for this effect (see, for example: Tilley, 2003 (Britain); Berghammer, 
2012 (Netherlands)). According to Berghammer (2012), family formation may 
imply religious involvement in the US differently than in Europe, as religion 
plays a pivotal role in social life in the US, whose church communities lend 
strong welfare support, particularly when compared to the more secular European 
countries. Apart from this possible reverse causality, determining a causal rela-








































































Therefore, rather than assessing causality, this study seeks primarily to under-
stand the nexus of relationships between religion, education, and fertility. 
Another limitation concerns the wording of the religion question in the 
British and French surveys. The BHPS asked respondents ‘Do you regard your-
self as belonging to any particular religion? If Yes: Which?’, whereas the French 
GGS question is phrased more affirmatively: ‘What is your religious affiliation 
(or your religion by birth)?’ Moreover, asking respondents to state their religious 
affiliation is considered a sensitive issue in France, resulting in a relatively 
high proportion of missing data (7.6% of respondents refused to answer this 
question) (Régnier-Loilier and Prioux, 2008). While this could lead to a bias, 
the proportion of French people who identified as Roman Catholic in the GGS 
data is similar to figures in other studies using different data sources.(4) Yet, 
the ‘no religion’ category in France may represent mainly those who were not 
baptized. Furthermore, some respondents may be classified as Catholic despite 
considering themselves to be in no way religious. Therefore, one should be 
cautious when interpreting the comparison of unaffiliated individuals in Britain 
(33%) and France (6%). However, to improve the comparability of religious 
indicators in these countries, we use a combined measure of religious affiliation 
and practice. Thus, in both countries, the ‘no religion’ group represents the 
least religious individuals, followed by nominally religious people, while the 
practising religious constitute those at the opposite end of the religiosity scale. 
III. Findings
Table 1 presents the sample characteristics of women aged 40–80 at the 
time of the British and French surveys: educational attainment, religious 
denomination and degree of involvement, proportion never-married, and pro-
portion of foreign-born. Each category includes the number of children ever 
born and the proportion of women who have ever had children.  
Women in Britain show generally higher levels of education than those in 
France, although these differences have diminished among women of more 
recent cohorts (not shown). In both countries, education is negatively correlated 
with the total number of children. Similarly, the likelihood of entering moth-
erhood decreases with education in both countries, but the gap by level of 
education is slightly greater in Britain. 
The proportion of religiously unaffiliated women is higher in Britain than 
in France (perhaps partly due to the different wording of the survey question), 
while the overall proportion of practising religious women is similar in both 
countries. As expected, women reporting no religious affiliation have the lowest 
(4) In the French GGS, 80% of all adult respondents who answered the religious affiliation question 
identified as Catholics, compared to 82% in a study by Baudin (2015), which used data from French 
lifestyle survey (Enquête Mode de Vie des Français) (2007), and to 76% in a study by the Pew Research 
Center (2013).  







































































completed fertility (1.8 children on average in Britain and 1.9 in France), 
whereas practising Catholic women have the highest completed fertility at 2.5 
and 2.4 children on average in, respectively, Britain and France. Nominally 
Table 1. Sample characteristics of women aged 40–80 
(using country-specific population weights)
A. Britain
% (n)
Number of children 
per woman 
% ever had children
Birth cohort
1928–1935 13 (402) 2.2 81
1936–1945 21 (657) 2.1 87
1946–1955 27 (833) 2.0 86
1956–1968 39 (1,185) 1.9 84
Education
Lower secondary 30 (926) 2.4 90
Upper secondary 39 (1,190) 1.9 85
Tertiary 31 (960) 1.8 80
Religious denomination
No religion 33 (1,023) 1.8 81
Nominal Protestant 43 (1,330) 2.0 86
Practising Protestant 12 (360) 2.1 87
Nominal Catholic 7 (210) 2.1 86
Practising Catholic 5 (155) 2.5 92
Never married 9 (276) 0.7 40
Foreign-born 4 (123) 2.0 83
Total 100 (3,077) 2.0 85
Source:  BHPS (2008).
B. France 
% (n)
Number of children 
per woman 
% ever had children
Birth cohort
1925–1935 17 (524) 2.5 85
1936–1945 21 (655) 2.2 90
1946–1955 30 (906) 2.0 89
1956–1965 32 (966) 2.0 88
Education
Lower secondary 47 (1,423) 2.4 91
Upper secondary 34 (1,035) 2.0 88
Tertiary 19 (593) 1.9 84
Religious denomination
No religion 6 (190) 1.9 82
Nominal Catholic 77 (2,347) 2.1 89
Practising Catholic 17 (514) 2.4 87
Never married 16 (474) 1.3 60
Foreign-born 9 (280) 2.4 93
Total 100 (3,051) 2.1 88








































































affiliated women in both countries also have higher fertility compared to 
unaffiliated women. Consistent with the findings on completed fertility, unaf-
filiated women are most likely to remain childless. Just over 80% of unaffiliated 
women in Britain and France have ever had children, while the proportion of 
mothers among religiously affiliated women is close to 90%.
The proportion of never-married women is higher in France than in Britain 
(16% vs. 9%). Moreover, the proportion of never-married women with children 
is considerably higher in France (61% vs. 41%). This can be attributed to the 
higher prevalence of non-marital cohabitation and childbearing outside mar-
riage in France, compared to the more conservative family-formation patterns 
in Britain (Perelli-Harris et al., 2009). 
Finally, the French sample is characterized by a higher proportion of foreign-born 
individuals (9% vs. 4% in Britain). The fertility levels of foreign-born women in 
France are also higher than the average family size in this country (2.4 children 
vs. 2.1); those of foreign-born women in Britain are similar to the average (2.0). 
This can be attributed to differences in immigration trends and to the composition 
of migrant populations in each country (see Kaufmann et al., 2012). 
Figure 2 reveals the distribution of educational attainment by religious 
group in Britain and France. The findings show no consistent pattern in the 




















































No religion Nominal Catholic Practising Catholic
A. Britain
B. France
Sources: BHPS (2008) for Britain; GGS (2005) for France.







































































relationship between religion and education. The greatest proportion of highly 
educated women in Britain is found among practising religious women (46% 
and 39% among practising Protestant and practising Catholic women, respec-
tively). In France, on the other hand, the greatest proportion of highly educated 
women is found among those with no religious affiliation (26% vs. 19% and 
20% among, respectively, nominally and practising Catholic women). 
1. The odds of having children by education and religious group
Table 2 presents the results of the logistic regression model for the odds 
of becoming a mother. Model 1 estimates the odds of entering motherhood as 
a function of combined religious affiliation and practice, woman’s education, 
birth cohort, and nativity. In Model 2, an interaction between religion and 
Table 2. Logistic regression for motherhood among women 
aged 40–80 at the time of the surveys (odds ratios)
A. Britain
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Birth cohort
1928–1935 0.516*** 0.524*** 0.357*** 0.359***
1936–1945 0.861 0.862 0.642** 0.635**
1946–1955 0.972 0.952 0.714* 0.690**
1956–1968 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign-born 0.899 0.933 0.927 0.968
Never married 0.077*** 0.075***
Religious denomination
No religion Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nominal Protestant 1.553*** 0.900 1.383** 0.665
Practising Protestant 2.039*** 1.841 1.754** 1.461
Nominal Catholic 1.504 0.847 1.352 0.686
Practising Catholic 3.273*** 0.754 2.350** 0.499
Education
Lower secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary 0.571*** 0.350*** 0.595*** 0.314***
Tertiary 0.393*** 0.254*** 0.415*** 0.227***
Religious denomination × Education
Nominal Protestant × Upper secondary 2.152** 2.655**
Nominal Protestant × Tertiary 1.830 2.485**
Practising Protestant × Upper secondary 1.093 1.402
Practising Protestant × Tertiary 1.188 1.213
Nominal Catholic × Upper secondary 1.869 2.080
Nominal Catholic × Tertiary 2.263 2.709
Practising Catholic × Upper secondary 12.236*** 12.365**
Practising Catholic × Tertiary 6.245** 7.539***
N 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077
Log pseudo-likelihood −1734.7 −1724.7 −1515.6 −1503.7
* p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.








































































education is introduced. As the interrelationships between education, religion, 
and fertility may be partly mediated by marital status, the control variable for 
never-married women is added to Models 3 and 4. The findings show that in 
both countries, women with upper secondary or tertiary education are less 
likely to become mothers compared to women with a lower level of education. 
However, this relationship is more robust in Britain than in France. In terms 
of religion, unaffiliated women are less likely to become mothers compared to 
nominally and practising religious women in both countries (although this 
odds ratio is not significantly different for nominally Catholic—relative to 
unaffiliated—women in Britain). 
Never-married women are significantly less likely to become mothers 
compared to ever-married women in both countries (Table 2, Models 3 and 4). 
Furthermore, when adding the covariate for never-married women, the mag-
nitude of the coefficients for the religious groups in Britain and France becomes 
slightly less large, which may indicate that some of the relationship between 
religion and the transition to parenthood is explained by differential marriage 
patterns among affiliated and unaffiliated women. 
Table 2 (cont'd). Logistic regression for motherhood among women 
aged 40–80 at the time of the surveys (odds ratios)
B. France
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Birth cohort
1928–1935 0.517*** 0.524*** 0.376*** 0.376***
1936–1945 0.904 0.909 0.549*** 0.547***
1946–1955 0.966 0.972 0.623*** 0.624***
1956–1965 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign-born 1.745** 1.754** 1.569* 1.567
Never married 0.097*** 0.097***
Religious denomination
No religion Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nominal Catholic 1.803*** 1.784 1.627** 1.965*
Practising Catholic 1.642** 1.576 1.591* 2.013
Education
Lower secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary 0.654*** 0.722 0.762* 1.052
Tertiary 0.445*** 0.392* 0.553*** 0.719
Religious denomination × Education
Nominal Catholic × Upper secondary 0.922 0.734
Nominal Catholic × Tertiary 1.093 0.738
Practising Catholic × Upper secondary 0.804 0.590
Practising Catholic × Tertiary 1.487 0.816
N 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051
Log pseudo-likelihood −954.5 −953.9 −812.8 −812.3
 * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Source:  GGS (2005).







































































An interaction effect between religion and education on the odds of having 
children is found only in Britain. Compared to unaffiliated women with lower 
secondary education, there is a significant positive interaction for nominally 
Protestant women with upper secondary and tertiary education and for prac-
tising Catholic women in the same educational groups (Table 2A, Model 4). 
No significant interaction is found for practising Protestant and nominally 
Catholic women in Britain. However, when Protestant and Catholic denomi-
nations are merged, the interaction between religion and education is significant 
for all nominal and practising women (see Appendix Table A.2).  
To better understand how religion and education interact with entry into 
motherhood, Figure 3 illustrates the predicted probabilities for motherhood 
Figure 3. Average predicted probabilities for motherhood by religious group and 






























No religion Nominal Catholic Practising Catholic
A. Britain
B. France








































































by religious group and education in Britain and France. Among unaffiliated 
women in Britain, those with upper secondary (medium) and tertiary (high) 
education are significantly less likely to have children compared to less- 
educated women within that group. By contrast, the differences in the pre-
dicted probabilities of motherhood by educational attainment are less 
significant among nominally and practising religious women. In France, on 
the other hand, no significant differences by education are found among 
unaffiliated women. Therefore, our first hypothesis is not supported in France, 
but it does hold in Britain: a stronger negative relationship exists between 
education and childlessness among religiously unaffiliated women compared 
to other religious groups.
2. Completed fertility gradient by educational attainment 
among religious groups
In this section, a Poisson regression model is used to predict the number 
of children ever born to women aged 40–80 at the time of the surveys in each 
country. The results of the model are presented in Table 3. The findings from 
Britain show that both nominally and practising religious women have a 
significantly higher number of children compared to unaffiliated women 
(Table 3A, Models 1 and 3). In France, on the other hand, only practising 
Catholic women show significantly higher completed fertility compared to 
unaffiliated women (Table 3B, Models 1 and 3). In accordance with the descriptive 
findings, education is negatively associated with the number of children in 
both countries, while never-married women have significantly lower completed 
fertility than ever-married women, although this relationship is somewhat 
more pronounced in Britain than in France. 
When including the interaction term for education and religion, a signifi-
cant positive interaction is found in Britain for nominally Protestant women 
with upper secondary and tertiary education, as well as for practising Protestant 
women with tertiary education when compared to the reference category of 
unaffiliated less-educated women (Table 3A, Models 2 and 4). When modelling 
all nominally and practising religious women in Britain together, we find a 
significant interaction for nominally religious women with upper secondary 
(medium) and tertiary (high) levels of education and for practising women 
with higher education (see Appendix Table A.3).
In France, a significant positive interaction is found for both nominally 
and practising Catholic women with upper secondary and tertiary education 
in relation to the reference group (Table 3B, Models 2 and 4). Therefore, con-
sistent with our second hypothesis, the findings from Britain and France point 
to a significant variation in the relationship between education and completed 
fertility across religious groups. Moreover, the interaction between religion 
and education in Britain and France remains significant when foreign-born 
women are excluded from the analysis (not shown). 







































































Figure 4 illustrates the adjusted predicted means of children ever born by 
religious group and level of education. In Britain (Figure 4A), the group of unaf-
filiated women show a linear decline in completed fertility by education: from 
2.3 children among the least educated women to 1.8 and 1.6 among, respectively, 
upper secondary and tertiary educated women. A negative fertility gradient is 
also found for nominally Protestant women, although the decline is less steep: 
from 2.2 children on average among lower secondary educated to 1.9 and 1.8 
children among women with upper secondary and tertiary education. By contrast, 
a U-shaped fertility curve exists for practising Protestants and nominally and 
practising Catholics, as the least educated have the highest completed fertility, 
followed by a decline among those with upper secondary education and then a 
Table 3. Poisson regression for number of children ever born 
to women aged 40–80 at the time of the surveys (incidence rate ratios)
A. Britain
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Birth cohort
1928–1935 1.041 1.049 1.000 1.006
1936–1945 1.011 1.014 0.974 0.976
1946–1955 1.002 0.997 0.961 0.957
1956–1968 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign-born 0.972 0.982 0.979 0.990
Never married 0.346*** 0.347***
Religious denomination
No religion Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nominal Protestant 1.106*** 0.993 1.068** 0.957
Practising Protestant 1.159*** 0.989 1.107** 0.954
Nominal Catholic 1.173** 1.123 1.140** 1.100
Practising Catholic 1.376*** 1.245 1.279*** 1.182
Education
Lower secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary 0.796*** 0.740*** 0.810*** 0.753***
Tertiary 0.774*** 0.658*** 0.798*** 0.680***
Religious denomination × Education
Nominal Protestant × Upper secondary 1.160* 1.159**
Nominal Protestant × Tertiary 1.209** 1.222**
Practising Protestant × Upper secondary 1.076 1.090
Practising Protestant × Tertiary 1.414*** 1.371**
Nominal Catholic × Upper secondary 0.955 0.945
Nominal Catholic × Tertiary 1.240 1.222
Practising Catholic × Upper secondary 1.054 1.017
Practising Catholic × Tertiary 1.280 1.243
Constant 2.124*** 2.286*** 2.338*** 2.511***
N 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077
Log pseudo-likelihood −6,889.6 −6,876.1 −6,690.8 −6,678.9
 * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.








































































rise among those with tertiary education. Furthermore, nominally and practising 
religious women with tertiary education have significantly higher completed 
fertility than do unaffiliated women with the same level of education. 
In France, there is also evidence of a U-shaped fertility gradient by edu-
cation among practising Catholic women (Figure 4B), with highly educated 
women in this group showing the largest family size: 2.6 children on average 
compared to 2.3 children for the least educated, and 2.1 children for those 
with upper secondary (medium) education. On the other hand, fertility declines 
with education among nominally Catholic and unaffiliated women, although 
the educational gradient of completed fertility is much steeper for the unaffil-
iated: from 2.5 children at the lowest level of education to 1.7 at the upper 
secondary level, and 1.5 at tertiary education. The corresponding predicted 
means for nominally Catholic women are: 2.3 among the less educated, then 
it declines from 2.0 to 1.9 children among moderately and highly educated 
women. Thus, as in Britain, the differences in completed fertility by religion 
are particularly pronounced at a high level of education. 
Table 3 (cont’d). Poisson regression for number of children ever born 
to women aged 40–80 at the time of the surveys (incidence rate ratios)
B. France
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Birth cohort
1928–1935 1.127*** 1.141*** 1.097** 1.110**
1936–1945 1.059 1.069* 1.001 1.010
1946–1955 0.975 0.980 0.927** 0.932**
1956–1965 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign-born 1.118** 1.132** 1.100* 1.112**
Never married 0.557*** 0.562***
Religious denomination
No religion Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nominal Catholic 1.086 0.919 1.058 0.919
Practising Catholic 1.182** 0.937 1.162** 0.954
Education
Lower secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary 0.853*** 0.656*** 0.875*** 0.690***
Tertiary 0.842*** 0.534*** 0.879*** 0.603***
Religious denomination × Education
Nominal Catholic × Upper secondary 1.318** 1.283*
Nominal Catholic × Tertiary 1.524*** 1.410***
Practising Catholic × Upper secondary 1.337* 1.297*
Practising Catholic × Tertiary 2.078*** 1.852***
Constant 2.040*** 2.398*** 2.280*** 2.608***
N 3,051 3,051 3,051 3,051
Log pseudo-likelihood −4,623.9 −4,611.7 −4,529.7 −4,520.7
 * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Source:  GGS (2005).







































































Overall, these findings support our second hypothesis, according to 
which the educational gradient of completed fertility is more strongly negative 
for unaffiliated women than for those who are more religious. The steeper 
decline in fertility with education among unaffiliated women may reflect 
disparities in the perceived cost and benefits of children for women in each 
religious group. 
Figure 4. Predicted means of children ever born by religious group and 






























No religion Nominal Catholic Practising Catholic
A. Britain
B. France
Notes:  Means adjusted for birth cohort, nativity, and ever-married. Bars represent 90% confidence intervals.









































































This study examines the interrelationships between religion, education, 
and fertility outcomes in Britain and France, focusing on women who have 
completed (or nearly completed) their reproductive years. First, we explored 
the distribution of educational attainment by religion, using a combined mea-
sure of religious affiliation and practice. Then, different types of regression 
analyses were employed to estimate the odds of having children and the number 
of children ever born as a function of education and the combined measure 
for religion. The descriptive findings show no consistent relationship between 
religion and educational attainment in Britain and France for women born 
from the 1920s to the 1960s. However, we do show that, at the individual level, 
greater religious involvement can go hand in hand with having obtained higher 
education, as the proportion of highly educated women among the practising 
religious group is either similar (in France) or higher (in Britain) than the 
average proportion. Furthermore, by analysing the interaction between edu-
cation and religion in relation to childbearing patterns, educational attainment 
is found to result in differential fertility outcomes among women with varying 
levels of religious adherence.
The first hypothesis, which predicted a stronger association between edu-
cation and childlessness among unaffiliated women compared to nominally 
and practising religious women, is supported by the findings in Britain but not 
in France. This may be due to the latter having smaller differences in child-
lessness rates by educational attainment. For example, bearing in mind both 
the relatively generous child-care provision in France (Rendall et al., 2009) and 
the greater disapproval of voluntary childlessness (Merz and Liefbroer, 2012), 
one may reasonably conclude that these contribute to the smaller variation in 
the proportion of women entering parenthood by level of education. In addition, 
women identified as religiously unaffiliated in France may differ from those in 
Britain due to differences in the survey questions on religious affiliation.
Nevertheless, when examining the interrelationships between education, 
religion, and completed fertility, we find a significant interaction between 
religion and education in both countries. Thus, consistent with the second 
hypothesis, nominally and practising religious women are less likely than 
unaffiliated women to reduce their family size when obtaining higher quali-
fications. The differences in the educational gradient in completed fertility are 
most pronounced for practising religious women, of whom the lowest and 
highest educated are found to have the largest family sizes. These patterns can 
be explained by variations in the perceived costs and value of children among 
different religious groups. As described above, religious involvement may affect 
the costs and benefits of a large family, through social rewards or psychological 
and practical support (Lehrer, 2004). In particular, women who regularly attend 
religious services are more likely to benefit from different types of assistance 
(Krause et al., 2001; Waite and Lehrer 2003; Chatters and Taylor, 2005). Because, 







































































on the one hand, family life and children are highly valued by religious com-
munities and, on the other, women who are more religious receive more support 
when seeking to expand their families, they perceive both the direct and 
indirect costs of children as lower than do other social groups. These combined 
high-fertility aspirations and improved social and financial resources could 
account for the U-shaped relationship between education and completed fer-
tility among practising religious women. Thus, not only is there no contradiction 
between religious adherence and higher education, increased human capital 
may enable higher fertility among the more religious groups.  
Despite the unique characteristics of the British and French societies, 
higher religiosity is linked with higher fertility in both; and it appears to 
attenuate the negative association between education and completed family 
size. These findings shed some light on the importance of religion in under-
standing variations in the relationship between education and fertility. As this 
study shows, the relationship between education and fertility outcomes is not 
uniform across religious groups, and in some cases higher education may lead 
to higher fertility, as we find among practising Catholic women in France. For 
this group, completed fertility is highest among the most educated women, 
which may be the result of placing a high value on children while improving 
the resources for having them and reducing their costs. Future studies should 
consider these complexities when analysing the effect of religion on  demographic 









































































Table A.1. Sample size and average number of children 
per woman for religious groups excluded from the study
A. Britain
n (% of valid sample) Number of children per woman
Christian (no denomination) 259 (7.4) 2.0
Muslim 19 (0.5) 3.4
Hindu 11 (0.3) 2.0
Jewish 15 (0.4) 1.7
Sikh 11 (0.3) 2.7
Other 48 (1.4) 1.8
Total 363 (10.3) 2.0
B. France
n (% of valid sample) Number of children per woman
Orthodox Christians 12 (0.4) 1.8
Protestant 68 (2.1) 1.9
Muslim 59 (1.8) 3.1
Jewish 19 (0.6) 2.3
Buddhist 8 (0.3) 1.8
Other 19 (0.6) 2.2
Total 185 (5.7%) 2.3
Coverage:  Women aged 40–80 at the time of the surveys, unweighted data. 







































































Table A.2. Logistic regression for motherhood among women 
aged 40–80 at the time of the survey in Britain (odds ratios)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Birth cohort:
1928–1935 0.515*** 0.525*** 0.356*** 0.364***
1936–1945 0.855 0.853 0.640** 0.633**
1946–1955 0.972 0.956 0.715* 0.697**
1956–1968 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign-born 0.950 0.983 0.959 0.998
Never married 0.077*** 0.074***
Religious denomination
No religion Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nominal Christians(a) 1.548*** 0.893 1.380** 0.665
Practising Christians 2.300*** 1.203 1.887*** 0.873
Education
Lower secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary 0.568*** 0.350*** 0.592*** 0.314***
Tertiary 0.390*** 0.253*** 0.413*** 0.227***
Religious denomination × Education
Nominal Christians × Upper secondary 2.109** 2.572**
Nominal Christians × Tertiary 1.887* 2.526**
Practising Christians × Upper secondary 2.182 2.803*
Practising Christians × Tertiary 2.151 2.389*
N 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077
Log pseudo-likelihood −1,736.1 −1,731.0 −1,516.1 −1,508.6
 (a) Compared to Table 3, these models combine Protestants and Catholics (called Christians).









































































Table A.3. Poisson regression for number of children ever born to women 
aged 40–80 at the time of the survey in Britain (incidence rate ratios)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Birth cohort:
1928–1935 1.033 1.043 0.993 1.002
1936–1945 1.001 1.008 0.964 0.971
1946–1955 0.997 0.995 0.956 0.955
1956–1968 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Foreign-born 1.018 1.035 1.023 1.039
Never married 0.345*** 0.346***
Religious denomination
No religion Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Nominal Christians (a) 1.118*** 1.009 1.080** 0.974
Practising Christians 1.227*** 1.086 1.162*** 1.041
Education
Lower secondary Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
Upper secondary 0.793*** 0.738*** 0.807*** 0.751***
Tertiary 0.768*** 0.655*** 0.793*** 0.677***
Religious denomination × Education
Nominal Christians × Upper secondary 1.133* 1.131*
Nominal Christians × Tertiary 1.221** 1.231**
Practising Christians × Upper secondary 1.046 1.045
Practising Christians × Tertiary 1.336** 1.299**
Constant 2.135*** 2.290*** 2.348*** 2.515***
N 3,077 3,077 3,077 3,077
Log pseudo-likelihood −6,895.1 −6,884.9 −6,695.1 −6,686.2
 (a) Compared to Table 3, these models combine Protestants and Catholics (called Christians).
 * p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01.
Source:  BHPS (2008).








































































adsera a.,  2006, Religion and changes in family-size norms in developed countries, 
Review of Religious Research, 47(3), 271–286. 
arGue a., JohNsoN d. r., White l. K., 1999, Age and religiosity: Evidence from a 
three-wave panel analysis, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 38(3), 423–435.
BalBo N., Billari f. c., mills m.,  2013, Fertility in advanced societies: A review 
of research, European Journal of Population, 29(1), 1–38.
BaudiN t.,  2015, Religion and fertility: The French connection, Demographic Research, 
32(art. 13), 397–420.
BecKer G. s.,  1991, A treatise on the family, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press.
BecKer G. s., leWis G. h.,  1973, On the interaction between the quantity and quality 
of children, Journal of Political Economy, 81(2), S279–S288.
BerGer P. l.,  1967, The sacred canopy: Elements of a sociological theory of religion, 
Garden City, NY, Doubleday.
BerGhammer c., 2012, Church attendance and childbearing: Evidence from a Dutch 
panel study, 1987–2005, Population Studies, 66(2), 197-212.
Bruce s.,  2002, God is dead: Secularization in the West, Oxford, Blackwell. 
BurKimsher m.,  2014, Is religious attendance bottoming out? An examination of 
current trends across Europe, Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 53(2), 
432–445.
chatters l. m., taylor r. J.,  2005, Religion and families, in Bengston V. L., Acock 
A. C., Allen K. R., Dilworth-Anderson P., Klein D. M. (eds.), Sourcebook of family theory 
and research, Thousand Oaks/ London/New Delhi, Sage Publications, 517–530.
edGell P., 2006, Religion and family in a changing society, Princeton, NJ, Princeton 
University Press.
esPiNG-aNderseN G.,  2009, The incomplete revolution: Adapting to women’s new roles, 
Cambridge, Polity Press.
freJKa t., Westoff c. f.,  2008, Religion, religiousness and fertility in the US and 
in Europe, European Journal of Population, 24(1), 5–31.
Glass J., Nath l. e.,  2006, Religious conservatism and women’s market behavior 
following marriage and childbirth, Journal of Marriage and Family, 68(3), 611–629.
Goldscheider c.,  1971, Population, modernization, and social structure, Boston, Little, 
Brown and Company.
Goldscheider c.,  2006, Religion, family, and fertility: What do we know historically 
and comparatively? in Derosas R., van Poppel, (eds.), Religion and the decline of fertility 
in the Western World, Dordrecht, Springer, 41–57.
Greeley a. m.,  2003, Religion in Europe at the end of the second millennium: A sociological 
profile, New Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Publishers. 
heatoN t. B.,  1998, Religious influences on Mormon fertility: Cross-national comparisons, 
in Duke J. T. (ed.), Latter-day Saint social life: Social research on the LDS Church and 










































































huBert s.,  2015, The impact of religiosity on fertility: A comparative analysis of France, 
Hungary, Norway, and Germany, Wiesbaden, Springer VS.  
humaN fertility dataBase,  2017, Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research 
(Germany) and Vienna Institute of Demography (Austria). Available at www.
humanfertility.org (data downloaded on 12 June 2018).
iNstitut NatioNal d’études démoGraPhiques (iNed)/iNstitut NatioNal 
de la statistique et des études écoNomiques (iNsee), 2005, Generations 
and Gender Survey France Wave 1, Version 4.2.
iNGersoll-daytoN B., Krause N., morGaN d.,  2002, Religious trajectories and 
transitions over the life course, International Journal of Aging and Human Development, 
55(1), 51–70.
KaufmaNN e., GouJoN a., sKirBeKK v.,  2012, The end of secularization in Europe?: 
A socio-demographic perspective, Sociology of Religion, 73(1), 69–91.
Krause N., ellisoN c. G., shaW B. a., marcum J. P., BoardmaN J. d., 2001, 
Church-based social support and religious coping, Journal for the Scientific Study of 
Religion, 40(4), 637–656.
lee l.,  2012, Losing faith? in Park A., Clery E., Curtice J., Philips M., Utting D. (eds.), 
British Social Attitudes 28, London, Sage, 173–184.
lehrer e. l.,  2004, Religion as a determinant of economic and demographic behavior 
in the United States, Population and Development Review, 30(4), 707–726.
lesthaeGhe r., surKyN J.,  1988, Cultural dynamics and economic theories of fertility 
change, Population and Development Review, 14(1), 1–45.
loNG J. s., freese J.,  2006, Regression models for categorical dependent variables 
using Stata, College Station, TX, Stata Press.
mcdoNald P.,  2000, Gender equity, social institutions and the future of fertility, 
Journal of Population Research, 17(1), 1–16.
mcquillaN K., 2004, When does religion influence fertility? Population and Development 
Review, 30(1), 25–56.
merz é.-m., liefBroer a. c.,  2012, The attitude toward voluntary childlessness in 
Europe: Cultural and institutional explanations, Journal of Marriage and Family, 74(3), 
587–600.
NeWmaN l. a., huGo G. J., 2006, Women’s fertility, religion and education in a low-
fertility population: Evidence from South Australia, Journal of Population Research, 
23(1), 41–66.
Ní BhrolcháiN m., BeauJouaN é.,  2012, Fertility postponement is largely due to 
rising educational enrolment, Population Studies, 66(3), 311–327.
Norris P., iNGlehart r.,  2004, Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 392 p.
ParGameNt K. i., KoeNiG h. G., Perez l. m., 2000, The many methods of religious 
coping: Development and vital validation of the RCOPE, Journal of Clinical Psychology, 
56(4), 519–543.
Perelli-harris B., KreyeNfeld m., siGle-rushtoN W., Keizer r., laPPeGård 
t., JasilioNieNe a., BerGhammer c., di Giulio P., KoePPeN K.,  2009, The increase 
in fertility in cohabitation across Europe: Examining the intersection between union status 
and childbearing (MPIDR Working Paper WP 2009-021), Rostock, Max Planck Institute 
for Demographic Research. 
Peri-rotem N., 2015, The role of religion in shaping women’s family and employment 
patterns in Britain and France (Unpublished doctoral dissertation), University of 
Oxford. 







































































Peri-rotem N., 2016, Religion and fertility in Western Europe: Trends across cohorts 
in Britain, France and the Netherlands, European Journal of Population, 32(2), 
231–265.
PeW research ceNter,  2013, 5 March, During Benedict’s Papacy, religious observance 
among Catholics in Europe remained low but stable, Pew Research Center, Religion & 
Public Life. Retrieved from
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/03/05/during-benedicts-papacy-religious-observance- 
among-catholics-in-europe-remained-low-but-stable/ 
PeW research ceNter,  2015, 2 April, Religious composition by country, 2010–2050, 
Pew Research Center, Religion & Public Life. Retrieved from 
http://www.pewforum.org/2015/04/02/religious-projection-table/2010/percent/all/# 
PhiliPov d., BerGhammer c.,  2007, Religion and fertility ideals, intentions and 
behaviour: A comparative study of European countries, Vienna Yearbook of Population 
Research, 5, 271–305. 
ProNzato c.,  2011, British Household Panel Survey consolidated marital, cohabitation 
and fertility histories, 1991–2009 (Data collection), 3rd ed., University of Essex, Institute 
for Social and Economic Research. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/
UKDA-SN-5629-1
PutNam r.,  2000, Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community, New 
York, Simon & Schuster.
réGNier-loilier a., Prioux f.,  2008, Does religious practice influence family 
behaviours? Population & Societies, 447, July–August.
réGNier-loilier a., saBoNi l., valdes B.,  2011, Presentation and modifications to 
the Generations and Gender Survey questionnaire in France (Wave 2): L’Étude des relations 
familiales et intergénérationnelles (EFRI) (Working Paper 173), Paris, INED.
reNdall m., couet c., laPPeGård t., roBert-BoBée i., røNseN m., smallWood s., 
 2005, First birth by age and education in Britain, France and Norway, Population 
Trends, 121, 27–34. 
reNdall m., eKert-Jaffé o., Joshi h., lyNch K., mouGiN r.,  2009, Universal 
versus economically polarized change in age at first birth: A French–British comparison, 
Population and Development Review, 35(1), 89–115. 
stolzeNBerG r. m., Blair-loy m., Waite l. J.,  1995, Religious participation in 
early adulthood: Age and family life cycle effects on church membership, American 
Sociological Review, 60(1), 84–103.
surKyN J., lesthaeGhe r.,  2004, Values orientations and the second demographic 
transition (SDT) in Northern, Western and Southern Europe: An update, Demographic 
Research [Special collection 3], 45–86. 
tilley J. r.,  2003, Secularization and aging in Britain: Does family formation cause 
greater religiosity? Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 42(2), 269–278. 
uNesco,  1997, International Standard Classification of Education: ISCED 1997, Paris, 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved from
www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/esd/inf.meeting.docs/EGonInd/ISCED.97.manual.pdf
uNiversity of essex, iNstitute for social aNd ecoNomic research (iser), 
 2010, British Household Panel Survey: Waves 1–18, 1991-2009 [Data collection], 7th ed. 
Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5151-1.
voas d., 2009, The rise and fall of fuzzy fidelity in Europe, European Sociological 
Review, 25(2), 155–168.
Waite l. J., lehrer e. l., 2003, The benefits from marriage and religion in the United 








































































Weller P.,  2007, Religions in the UK 2007–2010, Derby, Multi-Faith Centre, University 
of Derby. 
zhaNG l.,  2008, Religious affiliation, religiosity, and male and female fertility, Demographic 
Research, 18(art. 8), 233–262.







































































Nitzan Peri-rotem • Fertility DiFFerences By eDucAtion in BritAin AnD FrAnce: 
the role oF religion
Female education is generally associated with lower fertility and higher rates of childlessness. However, it remains 
unclear whether higher education implies similar fertility behaviour among women of different religious 
denominations at varying levels of religiosity. To assess whether this is the case, this study uses data from the 
British Household Panel Survey and the French Generations and Gender Survey to explore the intersection of 
religion (measured by religious practice, Catholic affiliation in France, and Protestantism and in Britain), education, 
and fertility outcomes for women born between the 1920s and 1960s. In Britain, higher education reduces the 
odds of entering motherhood more often among religiously unaffiliated women compared to nominally and 
practising religious women, although no such interaction effect is found in France. However, religiosity in both 
countries attenuates the negative relationship between education and completed family size. While unaffiliated 
women have a negative educational gradient of fertility, this study finds a U-shaped relationship between 
education and completed fertility among practising Catholic women. Moreover, differences in completed fertility 
by religious affiliation and practice are more pronounced among highly educated women. These findings are 
attributed to differences in the perceived value and costs of children across religious groups.
Nitzan Peri-rotem •  ÉcArts De FÉconDitÉ en Fonction Du niveAu D’instruction : 
le rôle De lA religion en grAnDe-BretAgne et en FrAnce
La fécondité baisse et l’infécondité augmente généralement avec le niveau d’instruction des femmes. On ne sait 
pas vraiment si un niveau d’études supérieures implique un comportement reproductif identique chez les femmes 
selon les confessions et les pratiques religieuses. Cette étude utilise des données issues de l’Enquête par anel 
auprès des ménages britanniques (BHPS) et du volet français de l’enquête Generations and Gender (GGS) ou Erfi, 
afin d’explorer les interactions entre la religion (mesurée par la pratique, l’appartenance à la religion catholique 
en France et au protestantisme et au catholicisme en Grande-Bretagne), le niveau d’instruction et la fécondité 
des femmes nées entre les années 1920 et 1960. En Grande-Bretagne, un niveau d’études élevé diminue plus 
souvent les probabilités de maternité chez les femmes appartenant à une religion que les autres, qu’elles soient 
ou non pratiquantes (cet effet d’interaction n’est pas retrouvé en France). Mais dans les deux pays, la religiosité 
atténue la relation négative entre le niveau d’instruction et la taille des familles. Alors que, pour les femmes sans 
appartenance religieuse, la relation est globalement négative, on constate une relation en U chez les catholiques 
pratiquantes. Les disparités de descendance finale selon l’appartenance et de la pratique religieuses sont plus 
prononcées chez les femmes les plus instruites, certainement à cause de perceptions différentes de la valeur et 
du coût des enfants.   
Nitzan Peri-rotem •  DiFerenciAs De FecunDiDAD según lA instrucción en grAn 
BretAñA y en FrAnciA. el pApel De lA religión. 
La instrucción femenina se asocia generalmente con una fecundidad (número medio de hijos por mujer) más baja 
y una tasa más elevada de infecundidad (proporción de mujeres sin hijos). Sin embargo, todavía no está claro si 
un nivel más alto de instrucción implica un comportamiento de fecundidad similar en las mujeres  de diferentes 
confesiones con diferentes niveles de religiosidad. Para comprobar si ese es el caso, este estudio utiliza los datos 
de la British Household Panel Survey y la French Generations and Gender Survey para explorar la intersección de 
la religión (según la práctica religiosa, catolicismo en Francia y protestantismo y catolicismo en Gran Bretaña), la 
instrucción y los comportamientos de fecundidad observados en las mujeres nacidas de los años 1920 a los años 
1960. En Gran Bretaña, un alto nivel de instrucción reduce la probabilidad de acceder a la maternidad más 
frecuentemente en las mujeres sin afiliación religiosa que en las mujeres afiliadas a una religión, efecto de 
interacción que no se observa en Francia. En los dos países la religión atenúa la relación negativa entre instrucción 
y descendencia final. Mientras que en las mujeres sin religión la instrucción y la fecundidad están correlacionadas 
negativamente, este estudio muestra  una relación en forma de U entre instrucción y descendencia final en las 
mujeres de religión católica. Además, las diferencias en la fecundidad completa según la afiliación y la práctica 
religiosa son más pronunciadas entre las mujeres con un alto nivel de instrucción.  Atribuimos estos resultados a 
las diferencias de percepción entre los grupos religiosos, en cuanto a los valores y los costos de los hijos.
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